This study investigates a growing issue for hotels and consumers: pricing across distribution channels. Research suggests that hotels should drive consumers towards direct channels with lower operating costs and away from intermediaries, yet few studies have investigated pricing practices across the direct communication channels that hotels control. The results of two surveys of over 100 Swiss hotels illustrate pricing inconsistencies in low-and high-season periods across four communication media under the properties' direct control: telephone, email, static website price lists, and reservation request forms on the website. About one out of two hotels offered different rates across these media, despite the requests being on the same date, for the same type room for the same period. Prices via email responses were the lowest in the low-season survey and website prices were lowest in the high-season survey. Across both surveys, prices were lower via online media-email, static website price lists, and reservation request forms-than via the telephone. Hotel category and number of stars showed a positive relationship with consistent pricing in the low season, and a negative relationship in the high season. Finally, price variations of over 200%-for the same room at the same date-across a hotel's direct online and offline channels serve as a wake-up call for hoteliers to review their pricing and procedures for communicating this pricing.
Introduction
. Hoteliers that successfully adopt electronic distribution should add value, develop their brand, and build customer loyalty; Anticipated over a decade ago (Emmer, Tauck, Wilkinson, & Moore, 1993) , electronic distributhose that fail may lose their customer base to intermediaries (Sigala & Buhalis, 2002) . tion in the hospitality industry has arrived, along with myriad questions on how this evolving distri-
The Internet is a double-edged sword for hoteliers. The market continues to grow, with online bution will affect operators and consumers (Caroll & Siguaw, 2003; O'Connor, 2003; purchasing expanding from business and leisure travelers to include corporate travel (Caroll & Frew, 2002; O'Connor & Piccoli, 2003; Thomp-106 MURPHY, SCHEGG, AND QIU Siguaw, 2003) . Furthermore, wired consumers are Tso & Law, 2005) . In a prescient prediction of online travel, Thompson and Failmezger (2005) affluent and frequent travelers (O'Connor, 2003 ). An Australian study found that online travelers posited that these price differences would "spur the emergence of travel search engines (i.e., metaspent twice as much as their offline counterparts (Bolin, 2002) . search engines) that can find the best room rate across all channels" (p. 14). In their July issue, Yet perceptions of better prices online have consumers shopping for last-minute hotel bargains
Laptop Magazine (Potter, 2005) labeled the metatravel search engine, Kayak.com, as an Editor's via web-based intermediaries and hotel websites (Enz, 2003; O'Connor & Frew, 2002; Choice and five-star travel super searcher. A limitation of these meta-search engines is & Piccoli, 2003; Thompson & Failmezger, 2005; Varini, Engelmann, Claessen, & Schleusener, 2003) .
gathering prices via hotel direct channels such as calling or emailing the hotel, or viewing static prices Repeatedly offloading unsold rooms via these online channels creates a dangerous precedent as on the hotel's website. Furthermore, compared to calling the hotel, many online channels-particucustomers quickly learn to wait for better deals. For hotels offering last-minute pricing, "the delarly the intermediaries-may mislead consumers on room availability (Thompson & Failmezger, mand boost will not be large, but the loss of revenue will be painful" (Enz, 2003, p. 5) .
2005). The prevailing online channel suggestion, however, is to drive customers to the hotel's own In addition to demand-based pricing (Hanks, Cross, & Noland, 2002; Toh & Dekay, 2002) , website rather than to an intermediary's website (O'Connor & Piccoli, 2003; Thompson & Failmanagement can draw upon technology in order to limit pricing products as commodities. Busimezger, 2005 ). Yet what happens when consumers land on the hotel's website, call the hotel, or email nesses can segment markets and price based on customer's purchasing behavior and website navithe hotel? While previous studies explored hotel pricing gation patterns (Ancarani, 2002; Iyer, Miyazaki, Grewal, & Giordano, 2002; Sotgiu & Ancarani, practices across direct and indirect channels (Lehman, 2003; O'Connor, 2003; Thompson & Fail-2004; Yelkur & DaCosta, 2001) . A less savory type of Internet pricing charges informed consummezger, 2005; Tso & Law, 2005) , this study adds a theoretical perspective to investigate three reers less and uniformed consumers more (Bayliss & Perloff, 2002) . Although Deck and Wilson (2002) search questions based on hotel direct channels. Do hotels maintain consistent pricing across the argue that tracking customers' website navigation patterns can lead to price-matching strategies that communication channels they control? Do hotels vary in their use of consistent pricing in the high blunt online competition, pricing based on customer profiles raise another concern: unfair pricing. and low seasons? Finally, does diffusion of innovations help explain hotel pricing practices across In a widely publicized example early this century, Amazon charged customers different prices the direct communication channels they control? for the same product (Deck & Wilson, 2002) . In a New York Times opinion piece on this incident, Literature Review the distinguished economist Paul Krugman (2000) Online Pricing argued the dynamic pricing is undeniably unfair and possibly illegal when people pay more beConsumers began using the Internet to seek information and entertainment; today the Internet is cause of who they are. Legalities aside, perceived price unfairness has negative consequences for also a convenient way to shop (Koch & Cebula, 2002; Kung, Monroe, & Cox, 2002 ; Vulkan, hotels and is an important topic (Kimes, 2002; Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005; Wirtz, Kimes, Theng, & 2003) . Since the dawn of electronic commerce, academics and the media predicted that competition Patterson, 2003; Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2004) .
At least three studies showing varying hotel among Internet retailers would approach the theoretical economic model of perfect competition. prices, usually for the same room at the same time, illustrate this possible perceived price unfairness Easily comparing web-based information on prices, features, and quality increases cost transparency (O'Connor, 2003; Thompson & Failmezger, 2005; (Sinha, 2000) . This transparency can force prices et al. , 1997; Biswas, 2004) . Online and offline, brands decrease price elasticity and increase the down, such as for burial caskets and life insurance (Clay, Krishnan, & Wolff, 2001; Levitt & Dubner, seller's power (Kung et al., 2002; Oh, 2003; Vulkan, 2003 Vulkan, ). 2005 Vulkan, 2003) .
The Internet also reduces search costs relative Conflicting results aside, cost transparency on the Internet can impair the seller's ability to obtain to visiting physical stores; shopbots and comparison sites lower search costs even further (Chevahigh margins, even for name brands, and turns goods and services into commodities (Sinha, 2000) . lier & Goolsbee, 2003) . Reducing search costs should intensify price competition and increase Thus, it becomes increasingly difficult for some companies to earn a profit (Birch & Young, 1997) . searching for better prices (Jiang, 2002) . Paradoxically, the growing number of web pages-the This negative outcome supports arguments that hoteliers should heed the trend of lower prices onpopular search engine Google indexed over 8 billion pages in June 2005-makes finding a better line and carefully monitor their prices across online and offline distribution channels (Enz, 2003 ; price increasingly tedious. As the economics of information theory argues, buyers "acquire informa-O' Connor & Piccoli, 2003; Thompson & Failmezger, 2005) . tion till the point where the marginal cost of acquiring additional information equals or exceeds
Traditional Hotel Industry Pricing the marginal benefit" (Biswas, 2004, p. 725) .
Online consumers may give up searching, optThe intangible nature of service and the perishable nature of hotel rooms complicate pricing deing to save time rather than save money (Clay et al., 2001; Koch & Cebula, 2002; Suri, Long, & cisions, such as differential pricing based on costs, locations, customer segments, and market willingMonroe, 2004; Varini et al., 2003; Yelkur & DaCosta, 2001 ). The previously mentioned metaness to pay (Yelkur & DaCosta, 2001) . Firms, however, must justify differential pricing to the search engine Kayak.com, however, expands and simplifies the search process, saving consumers consumer (Kimes, 2002; Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005; Vulkan, 2003; Xia et al., 2004) . One way hotels time by searching hundreds of sites simultaneously.
Increased access to online information supports justify different prices is by adding value such as access to special amenities (e.g., gym or parking) that consumers may find greater price dispersion in online markets than in offline markets (Ancaror services, yet evidence from Switzerland suggests that the industry has little knowledge regardani & Shankar, 2004; Pan, Ratchford, & Shankar, 2003) . Studies of books and airline tickets showed ing customers' willingness to pay for these amenities (Varini et al., 2003) . Added benefits aside, online price differences ranging from 18% to 59% (Clay et al., 2001; Koch & Cebula, 2002) . The hotel rooms are perishable. For hotels, as well as other industries with pergreater the perceived price dispersion, the more likely that consumers will search for better prices ishable inventories, revenue management is a logical evolution of pricing (Hanks et al., 2002) . Reve- (Biswas, 2004) . The consensus among researchers-price dispersion among Internet retailers is nue management matches prices to current inventory and demand, and then selects the optimal rate for large and online prices are modestly lower or actually higher compared to offline prices-contramaximizing capacity and revenue (Toh & Dekay, 2002) . This variable or demand-based pricing dicts the notion that the Internet has eliminated consumer search costs (Chevalier & Goolsbee, means that guests could pay a different price for each night of their stay. Best-available rate pric-2003).
Prices may be higher online due to factors such ing, a guaranteed lowest available rate for each night, helps reduce possible guest confusion over as auctions, price discrimination, shipping charges, and branding (Ancarani & Shankar, 2004; Koch & demand-based pricing. Research suggests that for multiple-night stays, customers prefer individual Cebula, 2002; Kung et al., 2002; Vulkan, 2003) . Consumers shopping in an interactive environrates for each night rather than an average price per night over the stay (Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005 , ment favor a familiar brand over an unfamiliar one due to the known brand's implicit guarantee (Alba p. 4).
Most US hotels, particularly mid-market hotels travel agents, their own websites, and new Internet intermediaries. In Western Europe, intermediary and less so low-market hotels, practice revenue management through dynamic pricing based on sales were 36% of online sales in 2003 (Marcussen, 2004) , but intermediaries change the economoccupancy levels (Enz & Canina, 2005) . But not all hotels adopt this approach. Apart from resorts ics of distribution by selling rooms beyond the hotelier's control, dictating prices, and charging fees that charge high-and low-season prices, most Swiss hoteliers-especially small and independent that erode hotel profits (Caroll & Siguaw, 2003; Enz, 2003; O'Connor & Piccoli, 2003 ; Sigala & properties-practice few sophisticated techniques, changing their prices just annually (Varini et al., Buhalis, 2002) . The above results, however, differ in a country 2003). Compared to lower rated hotels, however, five-star Swiss hotels vary their prices more often with few chain hotels and mostly independent operators, such as Switzerland. A survey of over 200 based upon supply and demand.
Category aside, hoteliers use several pricing Swiss hotels showed that three out of four bookings came through direct channels: 44% through options. In slow times, hotels let customers request prices lower than the quoted price (Hanks et telephone/fax contacts, 13% through the hotel website, and 17% through e-mail O'Connor, 2003) . In busy times, hotels overbook in order to cover last-minute cancella-2003) . The proportion of direct booking was higher in one-to three-star hotels (75-80%) than tions (Toh & Dekay, 2002) . Hotels also borrow from airline practices of advanced purchase disin four-to five-star hotels (67%). Online intermediaries had only a small market share (4%) in counts and variable refunds through single rates, room type rates, and fenced rates (Hanks et al., these Swiss hotels. Understandably, some hotels dislike net-based 2002). Fenced rates, one of several suggested online pricing options, include prepaid and nonretravel intermediaries (Marvel, 2004) . Hotel chains such as Cendant, Hilton, Marriott, and Starwood fundable stays in exchange for a reduced price, or upgrades, amenities, and fewer restrictions in now guarantee the lowest online rate in order to woo customers away from online intermediaries exchange for a higher price (O'Connor & Piccoli, 2003; Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005 , 2004) . distribution-based pricing successfully, charge additional fees or different rates based on distribuHotels should direct reservations to channels with lower operating costs-their own websites tion channels (O'Connor, 2003) . The impact of online pricing in the airline industry has led online (O'Connor & Piccoli, 2003) . In addition to paying no commissions on their website sales, hotels can intermediaries such as Expedia, Orbitz, and Travelocity to expand beyond airline tickets and to hoadjust the inventory instantaneously, adapting room prices to the supply and demand (O'Connor, 2003) . tel rooms (Thompson & Failmezger, 2005) . This growing online competition underscores the imGiven the right technology, hotels could also adjust prices based on customer purchasing behavior portance of hotels understanding the distribution costs and distribution shares associated with each and website navigation (Ancarani, 2002; Iyer et al., 2002; Sotgiu & Ancarani, 2004) . channel (O'Connor & Frew, 2002 ).
Horwath's Worldwide Industry Study lists diAcross channels, two suggested pricing strategies for hotels are maintaining consistent prices rect contact-telephone, fax, and email-as the predominant hotel distribution channel but this chanand varying the price according to the channellow prices in low-cost channels and high prices in nel dropped from 38% in 1995 to 34% in 2002 34% in (Marvel, 2004 . Online, hotels sell rooms via high-cost channels (O'Connor & Piccoli, 2003) . A later study argues for consistent rates across all website navigation, and price fences. The literature review also included arguments that customchannels, especially the hotel's direct channels. Consistent pricing saves consumers time searching ers dislike price unfairness, and suggested price consistency across all channels, particularly the difor better rates as well as assuring consumers of the best rate (Thompson & Failmezger, 2005) .
rect channels that the hotel controls. Five hospitality industry studies shed light on these arguments and support further investigation of price consisPerceived Pricing Fairness tency. In essence, hoteliers have a smorgasbord of
In an early study, Yelkur and DaCosta (2001) pricing options. Ample literature supports pricing investigated online pricing by 20 major hotel firms based on customers' past behavior or based on the present in Chicago. They argued that the Internet hotel's supply and demand. Despite the underlying facilitated differential pricing in order to target rationale for this dynamic pricing, inconsistent profitable consumer segments based on four facprices can raise consumer perceptions of unfair tors: demographics, socioeconomic, trip purpose, pricing and lead to confused customers questionand customer loyalty. They found that hotel groups ing and complaining about prices that seem unfair such as Marriott (Marriott Renaissance and Court- (Cox & Dale, 2001; Kimes, 2002; Vulkan, 2003; yard) and Bass (Holiday Inn and Crowne Plaza) Yelkur & DaCosta, 2001 ). These perceptions can adopted a common pricing practice across their cause customers to defect, spread negative inforproperties and that US companies tended to offer mation, and instigate other actions that damage the more differential pricing based on market segments seller (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003; Wirtz et al., than non-US companies. 2003; Xia et al., 2004) .
In perhaps the first study of pricing across The results of 10 experiments on price fairness channels, O'Connor (2003) investigated pricing by suggest that consumer knowledge of prices con-45 leading brands via the hotel website, hotel centributes to perceived unfairness (Xia et al., 2004) tral reservation system, and third-party websites and "from a consumer's perspective, price differ-(intermediaries). He found that one out of three ences appear fair(est) only if they can be attributed brands offered consistent pricing across the three to quality differences" (Bolton et al., 2003, p. channels. Economy and mid-price hotels offered 488). Yet it is hard to argue quality differences for lower prices via their websites compared to prices the same hotel room for the same date and booked from the central reservation service or third-party at the same time.
websites. With up-market brands, however, rates Furthermore, as the degree of transaction simiwere more likely to be higher on the hotel website larity may relate to perceptions of price unfairness compared to the other two channels. (Xia et al., 2004) , guests may question if whether Given travel agents' strong role in hotel distrithey contact the hotel by telephone or by email bution, Lehman (2003) compared agency catalogue will influence the room price. Consistent rates and online prices for vacation packages to three across channels, however, let consumers spend Red Sea resorts. The results failed to support lower less time searching and "confidently book the Internet prices and price dispersion and suggested hotel via any channel, while still being assured of a negative relationship with resort category. Comthe best rates" (Thompson & Failmezger, 2005, p. pared to offline prices, the two lower category re-15). In addition to confused customers and price sorts tended to have higher online prices and price fairness issues, the greater the perceived price disdispersion, while the luxury resort tended to have persion the more likely consumers should search lower online prices and price dispersion. for a better price (Biswas, 2004; Thompson & Tso and Law (2005) OnTravel.com (a local agency), the hotel website, and voice. The findings, collected over five conThe previous sections noted arguments for pricing based on customer demand, user profiles, user secutive months, revealed significant differences among the seven channels for the one-to fivesearch suggests that organizations adopt innovations over time (Rogers, 1995) , from trialing the innostar hotels; indirect distribution channels had lower online prices than the hotel's direct chanvation, to gaps in assimilating the innovation (Fichman, 2000; Fichman & Kemerer, 1999) , and nels of the website and telephone receptionists. Across the seven channels, the hotel's website finally to using the innovation well (Cooper & Zmud, 1990; Zmud & Apple, 1992 ). E-Business was the most expensive channel for the three-star category, the second most expensive for four-star adoption includes adding web-based processes (Dinlersoz & Hernández-Murillo, 2005) or feahotels, and the third most expensive for the fivestar category. For all hotel categories, the local tures (Murphy, Olaru, Schegg, & Frey, 2003) , and evolving website strategies (Dholakia & Kshetri, travel agency offered lower room rates than the six other channels.
2004; Doolin, Burgess, & Cooper, 2002; Teo & Pian, 2003) . Finally, Thompson and Failmezger (2005) compared rates and availability across five channelsFor example, some organizations "failed to establish procedures that move them to successful telephone, Expedia, Orbitz, Travelocity, and the hotel's website-by over 100 US hotels. On averimplementation of the most basic Internet tool, email" (Murphy & Tan, 2003, p. 548) . Electronic age across four market segments-luxury, upscale, mid-market, and budget-Travelocity, followed distribution, especially the growth of web-based travel intermediaries, has added further complexby the hotel website, had the lowest booking cost. Calling the hotel yielded the highest prices and the ity and dynamics in managing hotel distribution systems. Just as organizations fail to establish promost variance. In the luxury market, calling the hotel resulted in the lowest cost but the hotel webcedures for using email technology, hotels that adopt the Internet may fail to establish procedures site yielded the lowest cost with budget and midmarket properties. Similar to other studies, they for pricing their rooms across distribution channels. found wide discrepancies in rates and suggested that consumers shop around. Travelocity usually Hotels that implement Internet technologies well should, all things being equal, aim towards offered the best prices, but the authors estimated that comparison shopping would save consumers consistent pricing across the direct communication channels that they control: email, telephone, and more than 5%.
The five studies illustrate varying online and static price lists on websites. Consistent pricing for the same room on the same date and requested offline pricing practices, but differ on the relationship between category and pricing practices. Furat the same time would minimize perceived price unfairness, price dispersion, and consumers seekthermore, the studies fail to focus on the channel recommended by two studies (O'Connor & Picing a better price. Yet research has shown that hotels charge myriad prices for the same room at the coli, 2003; Thompson & Failmezger, 2005) ing results in pricing based on hotel category (Lehman, 2003; O'Connor, 2003) , the study also Research Question 2: Does hotel category relate to consistent pricing for the same type room on compares pricing across hotel categories in both high and low seasons. the same date and requested at the same time?
Sampling for this study stemmed from the 1558 One measure of when an organization adopts Swiss Hotel Association (SHA) hotels with a webthe Internet is the age of that organization's dosite. The SHA includes nearly all mid-to highmain name. These names, the suffix in a hotel's class hotels, underrepresents the budget sector, email address and website address, usually include and accounts for nearly 80% of all hotel overnight the hotel's name. For Australian businesses (Ngustays in Switzerland (www.hotelleriesuisse.ch, acyen, and the world's top cessed October 12, 2005). As higher rated hotels brands (Murphy, Raffa, & Mizerski, 2003) , orgaregistered domain names earlier than did lower nizational size relates positively to having a branrated hotels (Scaglione, Schegg, Steiner, & Murded domain name, such as hyatt.com or hilton.
phy, 2004a), the proportion of four-to five-star com. Tourism studies suggest that having these hotels was higher in this subpopulation. A random branded electronic addresses relates to a later step process, stratified across hotel category, selected of organizational Internet adoption-quality email 130 hotels with a website (13% zero to two-star replies hotels, 37% three-star hotels, and 48% four-to Tan, 2003).
five-star hotels). The study gathered the domain As noted earlier, organizations evolve in their name age for each hotel from the Swiss domain implementation of new technologies. Research has name database (www.switch.ch). used domain name age as a temporal measure of
The first survey gathered prices from three Internet adoption. The earlier an organization regcommunication media that the hotel controls: teleisters its domain name, the more successful the phone, email, and online price lists. The survey organization's implementation of its website (Goasked for just one room night during a slow period sain & Faraj, 2001). Thus:
for Swiss hotels. To increase the validity of the findings and to reduce overgeneralizing the results Research Question 3: Does the domain name (Babbie, 1997), a second survey replicated the age of a hotel relate to consistent pricing for the study during the busy season and for 1 week rather same type room on the same date and requested than for 1 day. The procedure was the same, exat the same time?
cept for including a fourth channel: reservation request forms on the website. Similar to email, the Research has shown that hotel size and category relate positively to the adoption and impleonline forms send an electronic request to the hotel, which hotel employees then answer via email. mentation of technology. Furthermore, domain name reflects a temporal measure of Internet adopAdding this fourth channel helped further explore how hotels implement the Internet with regard to tion. Exploring how hotels that tend to lead in the adoption of Internet technologies, larger and room prices. To ensure a high response rate, both survey rehigher rated hotels, as well as hotels that led in the adoption of domain names, should shed light on quests included a nearby alternative date in case the hotel was booked for the primary date. To repricing practices of the early adopters.
duce possible influence from multiple requests for the same dates, both surveys varied the informaMethodology tion requests-email, telephone, and online form in the second survey-so that no one channel was This study extends three previous studies (O 'Connor, 2003; Thompson & Failmezger, 2005; Tso & always first or last. To reduce possible bias due to different room types, all information requests Law, 2005) by focusing on four communication media under the hotel's direct control: email, webasked for a simple, standard room.
Results basic room at the same date-of almost double the price depending on the direct channel used. The results showed varying use of direct communication channels for pricing. All 130 hotels Average Channel Prices had an email address and telephone number on
The next two analyses, average channel prices their website. Over 9 out of 10 hotels (92%) listed and matched prices by channel, explored if any a price on their site and about two out of three channel tended to be more or less expensive. Fighotels (65%) offered a web form letting customers ure 2 shows the average high-and low-season request information. Although not a focus of this prices per channel. In both surveys, hotels offered study due to a low presence in a past Swiss study lower prices via online channels-websites and , one in eight hotels (12%) email-and calling the hotel gave the most expenoffered real-time bookings to let customers reserve sive average price. a room directly over the web. Just one hotel listed
The results of a paired sample t-test showed a special Internet price on the website, but this that telephone prices in the first survey, the low study used the basic rate on the website rather than season, were significantly higher than prices via the Internet special.
email [t(110) = 2.964, p = 0.004] and on the webFiltering out hotels closed during the booking site [t(110) = 2.367, p = 0.02]. Similar to the first time or those that failed to reply yielded 121 hostudy, the paired sample t-test showed that calling tels with telephone and email rates and 111 hotels the hotel yielded prices significantly higher than with rates across three media: telephone, email, hotel website prices [t(110) = 2.317, p = 0.022]. and prices on the website. The second survey, Differences between telephone and email prices in which added room rates through web request the second survey were insignificant, suggesting forms, allowed comparing 71 hotels on four media less price variance across channels during the high and 111 hotels across the first three channels. As season. this study investigated price consistency, the anal-A final analysis examined the 71 hotels in the ysis compared prices for the same hotel and for second survey with prices for all four channels. the same date.
Again, the highest average rate across all channels To validate the assumption that larger and was the telephone (175.4 CHF). Responses to reshigher rated hotels lead in the adoption of Internet ervation request forms (167.9 CHF) were the next technology, two statistical tests correlated domain most expensive, followed by website prices (169.0 name age with the number of rooms and category; CHF) and then by prices via email (166.9 CHF). both correlation tests confirmed the assumption.
The results of paired sample t-tests showed that There were significant (p < 0.001) and positive telephone prices were significantly higher than correlations with domain name age and both hotel rates from email [t(70) = 2.2326, p = 0.023], the size (Pearson's correlation = 0.441) and hotel catewebsite [t(70) = 2.139, p = 0.036], and reservation gory (Spearman's rho = 0.475).
request forms [t(70) = 2.049, p = 0.044].
Extreme Price Differences Matched Prices by Channel
The wide range of prices between one-star and In order to highlight price unfairness, Figure 1 shows the most egregious price differences found five-star hotels may have influenced the results using average prices. Given this possible bias, a nonin this study. In the first case, a customer that sought a basic room received a price of 39 Swiss parametric sign test (Kenkel, 1995) also examined the price differences. This test analyzes matched Francs (CHF) via email and a price of 80 CHF via the telephone-a difference of 205% for the same pairs, ranking a channel's price as higher, lower, or equal to another channel. In each matched data date. Alternatively, in the second case a customer would have seen a price of 98 CHF via email and pair if A > B, a "+" is assigned to the pair; if A < B, a "−" is assigned to the pair, and if A = B, the heard 48 CHF on the phone. Although the differences were less extreme in the other four cases, pair is eliminated from the sample and the sample size decreases accordingly. customers could still receive quotes-for the same To test the research questions, a series of bivariate correlations examined relationships between test, shows how often prices were equal, less, or more as well as the z score and significance level price consistency and three hotel characteristics: number of rooms, number of stars, and domain (two-tailed test). Telephone prices in both surveys were more expensive than online prices, signifiname age. Price consistency, operationalized as the number of times prices disagreed across chancantly so compared to email prices in the first survey and website prices in the second survey. There nels, ranged from zero if the price via email, the website, and telephone was the same to a maxiwere no significant differences in prices among the Internet channels in either season.
mum of three if all three prices differed. As not every website had a web-based form, the results in Table 2 compare the three channels used in both Consistent Pricing surveys. The two previous analyses-average channel In general, the results support significant relaprices and matched prices by channel-confirm tionships with price consistency and the three inthat the hotels in this study tended to quote the dependent variables found in previous diffusion highest price on the telephone. Yet the analyses studies: number of rooms, number of stars, and shed few insights on offering the same price domain name age. The direction of the relationacross channels. Consistent prices across all chanship, however, varied depending upon the season. nels assure consumers of the best rate and save During the low season, hotel size and domain them time searching for better rates (Thompson & name age showed a significant negative correlaFailmezger, 2005).
tion with consistent prices. In the high season, The proportion of hotels with equal rates across however, hotel size and number of stars showed a three channels-telephone, email, and prices list significant positive correlation with consistent on the websites-was marginally higher in the pricing. In essence, those hotels (i.e., larger and first survey (41%) than in the second survey higher rated properties) that tended to adopt tech-(37%). Across both surveys, hotels with consistent nologies earlier, tended to have more consistent pricing (39%) was higher than in O'Connor's pricing in the low season and less consistent pric-(2003) study of 45 major hotel brands (33%). This ing in the high season. comparison, however, fails to account for O 'Connor (2003) investigating more channels and the Conclusions and Future Research current study covering two seasons. Finally, about six out of seven (86%) hotels gave identical prices Managerial Implications via web forms and email, possibly explained by Ample research, as well as common sense, arthe same employee answering email and web form gues that customers dislike unfair pricing (Bolton requests. et al., 2003; Cox & Dale, 2001; Kimes, 2002; Vulkan, 2003; Wirtz et al., 2003; Xia et al., 2004;  Siguaw, 2003; Enz, 2003; O'Connor & Piccoli, tions to price differences and provide appropriate information and explanations for these differences 2003), some hotels seem to strive for more consistent pricing by guaranteeing the lowest online rate (Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005; Wirtz et al., 2003; Xia et al., 2004) . Customers should have access to avail-(Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005) . Academic suggestions and industry practices appear to be migrating toable pricing options and employees must be able to clarify the product differentiation (Kimes, 2002 ; wards consistent pricing for the same room, booked at the same time for the same date.
Rohlfs & Kimes, 2005) . Finally, management should train employees to deal with negative cusThis study, however, found that about one out of two Swiss hotels offered multiple rates to customer reactions to perceived unfair pricing, such as by offering compensation and allowing the customers-seemingly for the same room-with the difference in rates sometimes over 200%. These tomer to vent their frustration (Xia et al., 2004) . results suggest that Swiss hotels, and most likely non-Swiss hotels, should review the pricing-for Academic Implications the same room for the same dates-across channels that they control. In addition to in-house poliCompared to the traditional telephone channel, the results of this study showed that Swiss hotels' cies and procedures, hotel management should use a simple mystery shopping survey such as the one prices were slightly more advantageous for the customers via direct online channels, static webin this study to verify what prices customers will receive across different direct and indirect chansite price lists, and email responses. The better distinction may be between synchronous and asynnels.
Still, hotels may want to practice differential chronous channels. When buyers and sellers can negotiate simultaneously, the seller may report a pricing or have problems implementing consistent pricing. For the former, hotels should decrease the higher initial price yet be prepared to negotiate downward. With asynchronous channels, however, transaction similarity to help customers grasp the logic behind different prices. Successful transthe seller may report a lower initial price in order to keep the customer. parent pricing by low-cost airlines reflects that customers understand, and appreciate, dynamic Similar to other studies in the hospitality industry, this article extends and replicates hotel catepricing. For the latter, based on their review of competitor's prices, pricing across channels, and gory and hotel size as significant independent variables related to the adoption of Internet technologies. channel distribution costs, hotels should define and communicate a coherent and transparent pricUnlike early studies that investigated the presence of Internet tools ; Siguaw et ing policy to all stakeholders. This means, for example, updating the pricing information on the al., 2000; Wei et al., 2001) , this study followed a recent trend in adoption research-how hotels use websites and training telephone/email receptionists to market appropriate rates to potential custhose tools (Gherissi-Labben et al., 2003; Murphy, Olaru et al., 2003; . This study tomers.
Management should anticipate customer reacalso added an independent variable related to In-ternet adoption-domain name age (Scaglione et rates, fences, and restrictions during such periods in the larger hotels? Or do these hotels give higher al., 2004a; Scaglione, Schegg, Steiner, & Murphy, 2004b) . These three variables-hotel size, hotel rates on the telephone as they know that they probably do not have to negotiate down in the high category, and domain name age-related to the implementation of Internet technologies, showing season? significant correlations with pricing practices in both the high season and low season.
Limitations and Future Research The three variables-category, rooms, and domain name age-related to consistent pricing in
The results of this exploratory study fail to generalize to non-Swiss Hotel Association hotels as the low season, with the latter two showing respective significance levels of 0.001 and 0.006.
well as non-Swiss hotels. Furthermore, Swiss hotels are predominantly SMEs that only change The larger the hotel and the higher the category, the more likely the hotel had consistent pricing.
prices annually (Varini et al., 2003) . Longitudinal Swiss studies, including non-Swiss Hotel AssociaYet in the high season, size and category showed significant relationship, 0.012 and 0.006, respection hotels and comparison studies in other countries, could clarify if this late 2001 snapshot retively, with inconsistent pricing.
That domain name age showed a positive relaflects an aberration or trend. Similarly, future research should examine a common independent tionship with consistent pricing in the low season but no relationship in the high season could reflect variable related to hotel adoption of technologychain affiliation (Siguaw et al., 2000; Wei et al., a further stage of Internet implementation. The longer a hotel had a domain name (i.e., adopted 2001). Hotels may let customers request prices lower the Internet), the more likely that hotel had consistent pricing across the channels it controlled in the than the quoted price (Hanks et al., 2002; O'Connor, 2003) , but this study did not ask for lower low season. Unlike the larger and higher rated hotels though, hotels that adopted the Internet earlier prices nor for the lowest price. As noted earlier, hotels may tend to price higher in synchronous showed no significant relationship with inconsistent pricing in the high season. channels compared to asynchronous channels. Future studies could further standardize the room reAs shown earlier in this study, hotel size and category showed a significant and positive relaquest and ask for a better price via both channels, as well as add other synchronous channels [e.g., tionship with domain name age. Yet hotel size and category, but not domain name age, relate to inwalk-in requests, online chat, and Internet telephony such as Skype (www.skype.com)]. consistent pricing in the high season. This counterintuitive result helps support the premise that orgaIntermediaries played no role in this study and one could argue that distribution costs were equal nizations evolve in their use of technology, from trialing the innovation, to gaps in assimilating the for the channels in this study. Regardless of how the customer reserved the room in this studyinnovation (Fichman, 2000; Fichman & Kemerer, 1999) , and finally to using the innovation well telephone, email, or web form-a human eventually took the reservation. Still, hotels may have (Cooper & Zmud, 1990; Zmud & Apple, 1992) . Domain name age, rather than the organizational had a rationale for different prices for the seemingly same room. Future research could investicharacteristics, may be a better gauge of evolving website strategies.
gate other distribution routes such as online intermediaries and travel agents, as well as the impact In the low season, everything seems as suggested (O'Connor, 2003; Thompson & Failmezger, on pricing of their respective distribution costs. Similarly, future research could investigate larger 2005), with the bigger and higher category hotels leading in the use of consistent pricing. Yet the and chain-affiliated hotels' use of dynamic pricing in both direct and indirect channels. results in the high season raise several future research questions. Is it good practice to have incon-
In closing, further research should go beyond descriptive measure of consistent or inconsistent sistent pricing in the high-demand season? Do employees loose their control in the communication pricing. One such track could draw upon two recent studies that examine consumer behavior, such of rates in the high season? Are there too many 
